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Conservative policy institutes have reevaluated their position regarding
welfare and begun to present proposals to change social welfare policy.
Instrumental in this development are the American Enterprise Institute
and the Heritage Foundation, conservative think tanks which have devel-
oped projects for the purpose of making social policy more consonant with
conservative philosophy. If progressive organizations are to reassert their
role in the policy process, they will have to use some of the aggressive
techniques pioneered by the conservative think tanks.
One of the most important phenomena in the last 20 years has
been the emergence of public policy institutions as major players
in Washington.
Frank Shakespeare, Chairman
Heritage Foundation
INTRODUCTION
Since the beginning of the Reagan presidency, welfare pro-
fessionals close to the policy process have been dismayed at the
influence of conservative policy institutes on social welfare pol-
icy. Prior to 1980, conservatives seemed content to snipe at
welfare programs, reserving their attention for areas more in
line with traditional conservative concerns: the economy, de-
fense, and foreign affairs. With the election of Ronald Reagan,
however, a hoary and worn rhetoric about counterproductive
welfare programs suddenly gave way to some relatively so-
phisticated thinking about social welfare. In place of cliches
about welfare cheats, parochial bureaucrats, and bleeding-
heart social workers, conservatives made serious proposals
about workfare, community development, and child welfare.
In a short period, liberal hegemony in social welfare was chal-
lenged by conservative scholars who held a different vision of
American social welfare.
The influence of conservative thought in social welfare pol-
icy was the manifestation of an institutional change in Ameri-
can society that will, in all probability, influence domestic af-
fairs through the remainder of the century. This change was
not the result of a benign convergence of random events-
rather, it was orchestrated. In the 1970s, a group of conser-
vatives set their sights on the New Deal and created the institu-
tional base for its overhaul, the conservative think tanks.
William J. Baroody, Jr., then President of the American Enter-
prise Institute for Public Policy Research (AEI), stated the mis-
sion clearly,
The public philosophy that has guided American policy for dec-
ades is undergoing change. For more than four decades, the
philosophy of Franklin Delano Roosevelt's New Deal prevailed,
in essence calling upon government to do whatever individual
men and women could not do for themselves.
Today we see growing signs of a new public philosophy, one
that still seeks to meet fundamental human needs, but to meet
them through a better balance between the public and private
sectors of society.
The American Enterprise Institute has been at the forefront
of this change. Many of today's policy initiatives are building on
intellectual foundations partly laid down by the Institute (Bar-
oody, n.d.: 2).
Within a decade, conservatives halted a half-century of
growth in governmental welfare programs, and in so doing
effectively removed from public debate the classic agenda for
liberal welfare reform-full-employment, a guaranteed annual
income, and national health care. The ascendance of conser-
vative thought reflected the capacity of conservative policy in-
stitutes to conceive bold approaches to social problems, present
5these to legislators in succinct analyses, and promote conser-
vatism to the public by effective use of the media. Through the
quiet and persistent application of these methods, conservative
think tanks dramatically took the middle ground in the debate
on social policy. "Conservative thinking has not only claimed
the presidency," Gregg Easterbrook concluded in his Atlantic
Monthly article on conservative policy institutes, "it has spread
throughout our political and intellectual life and stands poised
to become the dominant strain in American public policy"
(1986: 66).
LIBERAL THINK TANKS
That initiatives to alter welfare are designed by "think
tanks," as policy institutes are sometimes called, outside of
public legislative process is not new-liberal institutes have
been engineering social policy for half a century. Historically,
policy institutes are a manifestation of the belief held by Pro-
gressives that social problems could be ameliorated through
scientific analysis and the formulation of non-partisan policies.
By 1920, corporate philanthropists were making substantial
contributions to policy analysis organizations that weighed al-
ternatives to the needs of the nation's labor force. Subse-
quently, much of the foundation for programs of the New Deal
had been conceptualized earlier by the Brookings Institution,
the National Bureau of Economic Research, and the Twentieth
Century Fund (Domhoff, 1970: 195). Other organizations, such
as the Russell Sage Foundation, the Carnegie Foundation, and
the Urban Institute, were instrumental in defining the Ameri-
can welfare state. "Think tanks have had considerable impact,
both on the private and on the public sector, in promoting the
use of policy analysis, programming, evaluation and long-
range planning," wrote Guy Benveniste, "Government agen-
cies or private corporations with large planning staffs of their
own turn to the think tanks for access to their sources of infor-
mation" (1977: 115, 114).
By the mid-1970s, however, some liberal analysts were ex-
pressing misgivings about uncontrolled expansion of welfare
programs; and, the correct role of government in social welfare
became a subject for discussion in liberal institutes. In 1977
Charles Schultze, having been Director of the Bureau of the
Budget in the Johnson administration and Chairman of the
President's Council of Economic Advisors under President Car-
ter, wrote The Public Use of Private Interest as a senior fellow at
Brookings. In it, he argued that government intervention,
through higher expenditures and increased regulation, was in-
ferior to market strategies in dealing with social problems
(1977). In 1978, the Urban Institute published Private Provision
of Public Services, a programmatic evaluation of non-govern-
mental activity in several areas including social welfare (Fisk, et
al., 1978).
In seeking to elaborate and innovate welfare policies and
programs, the liberal think tanks followed a formula that had
worked well in the past. High quality research conducted by
distinguished scholars and presented in a non-partisan format
was the best way to evaluate existing programs and propose
new policies. In so doing, the liberal institutes served as tech-
nical consultants, addressing social problems with a studied
reason that reflected their essentially reactive role. While liberal
think tanks sought to elaborate and innovate welfare policies
and programs, conservative think tanks were marshaling re-
sources with other objectives in mind. Conservatives' stockpil-
ing of money and staff paid off when the election of Ronald
Reagan assured them an unobscured target-the welfare state.
Ironically, much of the groundbreaking for the conservative
assault on the welfare state had been done in liberal
institutions.
CONSERVATIVE POLICY INSTITUTES
The rapid rise of conservative think tanks is usually at-
tributed to Irving Kristol, a political scientist and editor who
reasoned that the business community had little basis for com-
plaint about the products of liberal policy institutes as long as it
continued to fund their operations (1982). Instead, Kristol pro-
posed supporting conservative institutes, an idea that prom-
ised superior return on investment-and one that was pursued
by American corporations and their foundations with an en-
thusiasm that approached vengeance. In a short period, two
conservative policy institutes came to typify the second genera-
tion of think tanks: the American Enterprise Institute and the
Heritage Foundation.1
The American Enterprise Institute
Long noted for its slavish adherence to pro-business posi-
tions on social issues, AE had developed, by the early 1980s, a
sophisticated sense of American "intellectual politics" (Stein-
fels, 1979: 11). With a budget and staff comparable to a pres-
tigious college, AEI was able to recruit an impressive number of
notable figures and scholars, and maintain projects on a
number of important domestic policy areas: economics, educa-
tion, energy, government regulation, finance, taxation, health,
jurisprudence, and public opinion. 2 Under "religion, philoso-
phy, and public policy," AEI promoted two important projects
to be considered shortly: the mediating structures project and
the project on democratic capitalism. In addition to these on-
going projects, AEI sponsored investigations in several special
areas: the study of private initiative, neighborhood revitaliza-
tion, and legislative analyses (AEI, n.d.).
The scope of AEI activities was matched only by the pool of
influential and talented personnel comprising the staff. At the
height of its influence, AEI maintained a stable of over thirty
scholars and fellows in residence, on salaries ranging from
$30,000 to $50,000 a year (Stone, 1981) who prepared analyses
in the various policy study areas. The institute's senior fellows
included the aforementioned Kristol, Herbert Stein, an econo-
mist and chairman of the President's Council of Economic Ad-
visors in the Nixon administration, and Ben Wattenberg, a vet-
eran public opinion analyst. The AEI distinguished fellow was
Gerald R. Ford, thirty-eighth president of the United States.
As the most prominent conservative organization in the
idea industry of the period, AEI's budget swelled-from
$800,000 in 1970, to $5 million in 1978, to $11.7 million in 1982.
Forty-three percent of the 1982 budget was derived from large
corporate contributors, such as Bethlehem Steel, Exxon, J.C.
Penney, and the Chase Manhattan Bank. An equal portion of
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the budget came from foundations, notably the Lilly Endow-
ment, the Smith Richardson Foundation, the Rockefeller Broth-
ers Trust, and the Earhart Foundation (Weinraub, 1981). With a
budget so heavily dependent on corporate funding, AEI re-
quired a lifeline to the business community, and the Board of
Trustees served that function. Of the twenty-four members of
the AEI Board of Trustees in 1984, twenty-one were chief exec-
utives of Fortune 500 firms. 3
AEI has also been careful to select its staff from govern-
ment service and to grant leaves to staff when their services are
desired by an administration. When Ronald Reagan assumed
office, eighteen AEI staff joined the new administration. A re-
view of AEI scholars and fellows in residence revealed broad
exposure to government agencies, including the Departments
of Housing and Urban Development, Justice, and Treasury.
Two were former members of the President's Council of Eco-
nomic Advisors. Among AEI staff cycled back into government
service were Rudolph Penner, now Director of the Congres-
sional Budget Office and James Miller III, the current Director
of the Office of Management and Budget. 4
This assured that no social policy proposal received serious
consideration without first passing the review and comment of
AEL. By the time a policy proposal had reached the legislative
arena, the odds were high that the AEI imprint would be rein-
forced by testimony from one or more of the highly-creden-
tialed scholars in residence, or the 77 adjunct scholars, or the
250 professors across the nation who were affiliated with AEI
(Stone, 1981). Sometimes, however, influence was exerted in a
subtle manner. In 1982, for example, AEI marked the comple-
tion of its project "to determine whether the private sector
[could] play a larger role in dealing with a range of problems in
our society and in delivering needed human services" by pub-
lishing Meeting Human Needs: Toward a New Public Philosophy.
The first copy was delivered to President Reagan at the White
House by AEI's President Baroody-personally (AEI, 1982).
In domestic affairs, AEI has focused its considerable re-
sources and talent on two projects in its mission of social re-
form. The first project in the endeavor, the "mediating struc-
tures project," enlisted the services of Peter Berger, a
sociologist, and John Neuhaus, a theologian. In the major pub-
lication of the project, To Empower People, Berger and Neuhaus
stated that the fundamental social problem of our times was the
growth of megastructures, such as big government, big busi-
ness, big labor, and professional bureaucracies, and a corre-
sponding diminishment of individuals. The route to empower-
ment of people, then, was to revitalize "mediating structures,"
among them, the neighborhood, family, church, and voluntary
association (1977). To Empower People was a readable and lucid
booklet that served AEI well. The apparent impartiality of the
mediating structures project, however, was little more than
veneer-Peter Berger's hostility toward liberals was to surface
in later works. 5 The project's implicit critique of government
programs was clearly evident in a modest study of the Meals on
Wheels program by AEI's Michael Balzano. In Federalizing
Meals on Wheels, Balzano argued that the Older Americans Act
diminished the voluntary impulses of church and community
groups (mediating structures) by subsidizing nutritional pro-
grams for the elderly. "In most cases, common sense and the
desire to help one's neighbor are all that are necessary," Bal-
zano concluded. "One does not need a masters degree in social
work or gerontology to dish out chow at a nutrition center"
(1979: 37).
Following the mediating structures project, the project on
democratic capitalism endeavored to elevate the role of the
corporation in public life. This necessitated a bit of theoretical
hanky-panky since the mediating structures project had por-
trayed big business as a megastructure and, therefore, inimical
to the vitality of mediating structures. The problem was dis-
posed of deftly by Michael Novak, a theologian and director of
the project. In Toward a Theology of the Corporation, Novak used
no more than a footnote to transfer big business from its desig-
nation as a megastructure to that of a mediating structure, ef-
fectively portraying big government as an institution of cultural
and economic oppression against a corporate sector that has
been the genius behind the American experience (1981:5).
Under the direction of Novak, the project on democratic
capitalism intended to reform the national philosophy by de-
picting the corporation as a promoter of cultural enlightenment
rather than a perpetrator of vulgar capitalism. "The social in-
strument invented by democratic capitalism to achieve social
goals is the private corporation," he proselytized.
The corporation ... is not merely an economic institution. It is
also a moral and a political institution. It depends on and gener-
ates new political forms . . . Beyond its economic effects, the cor-
poration changes the ethos and the cultural forms of society
(1981: 50).
At the same time, Novak took careful aim at the public sector,
explaining, "I advise intelligent, ambitious, and morally se-
rious young Christians and Jews to awaken to the growing
dangers of statism. They will better serve their souls and serve
the Kingdom of God all around by restoring the liberty and
power of the private sector than by working for the state"
(1981: 28).
Subsequently, AEI's "democratic capitalism" became a cul-
tural analysis in which the corporation is part of a three-part
system of checks and balances. 6 Society, according to Novak, is
a trinity comprised of the economy, the state, and a social-
culture, each represented by the corporation, government, and
mediating structures (including the church), respectively. By
elevating the concept of pluralism from the political context to
the cultural, the viability of the corporate sector is positively
associated with a free society. Thus sanctified, the corporation
is less an economic abstraction and more a vehicle for social-
cultural, indeed religious, transformation. "Capitalist produc-
tivity, efficiency, and economic rationality," observed a critic of
Novak, "are conducive to virtue and self-government" (Stein-
fels, 1983, 13).
The Heritage Foundation
In 1986 AE faltered. Organizational problems led to the
resignation of Baroody; and, the Heritage Foundation assumed
leadership in defining the conservative outlook on social pol-
icy. Established in 1973 by a $250,000 grant from the Coors
family (Reeves, 1984), the Heritage 1983 budget of $10.6 million
already approximated those of the Brookings Institution and
AEI (Heritage, 1983). Espousing a militant conservative ide-
ology, Heritage effected social policy by proposing radical alter-
natives to established programs and by slanting its work to the
religious right. By breaking new ground while building mass
support for policy initiatives, Heritage complemented the less
partisan analyses of AEI. Like AEI, Heritage sustained a livery
of conservative scholars-over 100-who prepared position
statements. Like AEI, Heritage placed staff-26 full-time and
13 part-time-in government posts during the Reagan admin-
istration (Reeves, 1984).
Heritage social policy initiatives emphasized privatization,
reforming social welfare by transferring activities from govern-
ment to business. Implicit in this is an unqualified antagonism
toward government intrusion in social affairs. Government
programs are faulted for a breakdown in the mutual obligations
between groups, the lack of attention to efficiencies and incen-
tives in the way programs are operated and benefits awarded,
the induced dependency of beneficiaries on programs, and the
growth of the welfare industry and its special interest groups,
particularly professional associations (Butler, 1984).
This critique served as a basis for the aggressive stance
taken by Heritage in urban development, income security, and
social welfare policies. The Heritage prescription for urban re-
vitalization, the urban enterprise zone (UEZ) concept, was im-
ported from the Adam Smith Institute of England in the form of
Stuart Butler (Lewthwaite, 1984). According to Butler, eco-
nomically disadvantaged areas would attract industry by re-
ducing taxes, employee expenses, and health and safety reg-
ulations (Sternlieb, 1981). The UEZ concept came to the
attention of Congressman Jack Kemp who convinced the Rea-
gan administration to make it the centerpiece of its urban pol-
icy. This market strategy for urban revewal was proposed as a
replacement for Economic development Administration and
Urban Development Action Grant programs in which govern-
ment had provided technical assistance and funds to direct
urban development (Butler, 1981). When UEZ legislation be-
came stalled in Congress, Heritage changed tactics targeting
states and localities. By late 1984, Butler noted that 30 states
and cities had created over 300 UEZs (Lewthwaite, 1984).
In income security, Heritage prepared an oblique assault
on the Social Security program in conjunction with the conser-
vative Cato Institute, promoting a parallel system of Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs). Under "The Family Security
Plan," proposed by Peter J. Ferrara, former senior staff member
of the White House Office of Policy Development, the initial
IRA provisions of the 1981 Economic Recovery and Tax Act
would be expanded to allow individuals "to deduct their an-
nual contributions to ... IRAs from their Social Security
payroll taxes" (1982: 51). While substituting IRA investments
for Social Security contributions was not well-received by liber-
al politicians, Heritage banked on future support from egoistic
workers of the baby boom generation. "If today's young work-
ers could use their Social Security taxes to make ... invest-
ments through an IRA," hypothesized Ferrara, "then, assum-
ing a 6 percent real return, most would receive three to six
times the retirement benefits promised them under Social Se-
curity" (1984: 7). According to this calculus, the interaction of
demographic and economic variables would lead to increasing
numbers of young workers salting away funds for themselves
because of high investment returns as well as the fear that
Social Security would provide only minimal benefits on retire-
ment. If correct, the result would be a sure-fire formula for
eroding the popular and financial support for Social Security.
Regarding welfare policy, Heritage was instrumental in
scouting Charles Murray, whose Losing Ground provided much
of the rationale for the conservative assault on federal welfare
programs. In 1982, a pamphlet Murray had written for
Heritage, entitled "Safety Nets and the Truly Needy," came to
the attention of the Manhattan Institute, a conservative New
York think tank (Lane, 1985). Traded by Heritage to Manhat-
tan, Murray elaborated his allegation that government social
programs of the Great Society had actually worsened the condi-
tions of the poor. Murray's wrecking-ball thesis advocated no
less than a "zero-transfer system" which consisted of "scrap-
ping the entire federal welfare and income support structure
for working-aged persons" (1984: 226, 227). Remembering his
earlier sponsor, Murray returned to Heritage on December 12,
1984 to promote his book to a standing-room-only audience for
a symposium entitled, "What's Wrong with Welfare?"
Heritage, unlike the restrained AEL, has been willing to
lend its name to militant conservatives of the religious right,
providing intellectual support to "the traditionalist move-
ment." The most comprehensive-and sympathetic-treat-
ment of the traditionalist movement is Back to Basics by Burton
Pines, vice-president of the Heritage Foundation. In this highly
readable book, Pines applauded local conservative activists for
their challenge to liberal values and chronicled the offensive
launched against programs of the welfare state. "Pro-family"
traditionalists had disrupted the White House Conference on
Families, a grass-roots mobilization that effectively precluded
any progressive legislation that might have evolved out of the
Conference. Traditionalists also enjoined proponents of the
Domestic Violence Bill in protracted debate, holding up the
legislation until a Republican-controlled Senate let it expire.
Finally, traditionalists supported the Family Protection Act, a
conservative proposal limiting contraception, abortion, chil-
dren's rights, and sex education, and reducing federal support
for programs aiding homosexuals and the divorced (1982). Al-
though the Family Protection Act was not passed, it succeeded
at diverting the attention of the public toward traditional val-
ues, which were portrayed positively, and away from liberal
values, which were considered ruinous.
Pines noted the pivotal role of conservative think tanks in
the traditionalist movement and was quick to acknowledge his
debt to AEI, an organization he described as focusing "pri-
marily on long (sometimes very long) range and fundamental
transformation of the climate of opinion." Bringing the conser-
vative Hoover Institution of Stanford into the fold, Pines char-
acterized their work as a crusade. "Together," he concluded,
"Hoover, AEI, and Heritage can today deploy formidable armi-
es on the battlefield of ideas-forces which traditionalist move-
ments previously lacked" (1982: 254).
DENOUEMENT
By the end of the second term of the Reagan presidency,
the welfare policy gambit of the conservative think tanks had
met with mixed results. On the one hand, policy institutes-
like AEI and Heritage-have effectively reversed the liberal
momentum in social welfare that had characterized domestic
policy since the New Deal. Nowhere is this more evident than
in current proposals for welfare reform. While conservative
plans, such as that of the Reagan administration, are typically
punitive, plans from liberal politicians are reflecting the shift
toward conservatism. Congressman Harold Ford's "Family
Support Program" focuses on workfare and is budgeted at $2.5
billion per year, an amount that fails to come close to recouping
the amounts cut from social welfare programs during the Rea-
gan era. 7 The "Family Security Act" of Senator Daniel Patrick
Moynihan emphasizes child support enforcement and work-
fare, and is budgeted at $2.3 billion for the first five years of the
program (Moynihan, 1987). The "Family Security Act" is sym-
bolic of reversals suffered by liberals in their attempt to define
social welfare policy-during the Nixon administration,
Moynihan promoted a guaranteed annual income proposal,
the "Family Assistance Plan." And, Moynihan does not stand
alone. Within two months of presenting the Family Security
Act, 54 senators had signed up as co-sponsors, many of them
liberals ("Moynihan," 1987).
Although liberals are no longer dominant in establishing
public philosophy in the United States, conservatives have
failed to place a coherent set of alternative policies in the
breach-particularly as regards social welfare policy. This is
surprising considering the momentum achieved by conser-
vatives early in the first term of the Reagan administration and
the quality of thought given to programs proposed by conser-
vatives. Perhaps the best concept around which to organize a
conservative version of the welfare state was the enterprise
zone idea, which was endorsed by groups as disparate as the
U.S. Chamber of Commerce and the Urban League. But, the
enterprise zone legislation faded due to lack of enthusiasm on
the part of the Reagan administration. Thus, it is with no small
sense of frustration that-seven years into the Reagan "revolu-
tion"-Stuart Butler, proponent of the enterprise zone concept
and Director of Domestic Policy for Heritage, complained that a
conservative formulation of welfare had yet to be fashioned
(1987).
CONSERVATIVE LESSONS FOR A PROGRESSIVE
FUTURE
The success of conservatives in halting the liberal impetus
in welfare policy, coupled with the failure to install a viable
candidate to the welfare state, have created the opportunity for
progressives to regain influence in social welfare policy.8 Al-
ready, new policy institutes have emerged around progressive
groups, among them the Center on Budget and Policy Pri-
orities, the Children' Defense Fund, and the National Center
for Social Policy and Practice. What remains to be seen is
whether this "third generation" of policy institutes will be able
to exploit the methods pioneered by the second generation of
conservative institutes or return to the passive stance charac-
teristic of the first generation of liberal think tanks.
Apart from the pragmatic consideration that conservative
policy institutes have developed effective methods for packag-
ing and marketing social policy, there is a theoretical basis for
arguing that progressive organizations should adopt conser-
vative tactics. Early in the industrial revolution, Marx posed a
central question: "Who controls the means of production?" A
mature industrial order and the expansion of civil bureaucracy
provoked Weber to offer a sequel: "Who controls the means of
administration?" The evolution of a post-industrial order
where primary economic activity occurs in a service sector de-
pendent on processed information raises another key question:
"Who controls the means of analysis?" Clearly, the conser-
vative think tanks have proven adept at fashioning an analysis
that is both compatible with the interests of their sponsors and
effective at swaying public opinion. That such organizations
should become so influential in the social policy process is con-
sistent with power structure theorists, such as C. Wright Mills
(1956) and G. William Domhoff (1970, 1979). Their work helps
explain much of the triumph of the conservative think tanks,
and it provides a clue for the new, liberal policy institutes.
Progressive think tanks will be effective to the extent that they
exploit the power structure and learn to control the means of
analysis.
END NOTES
1. Other conservative institutes, such as the Hoover Institution and the Cato
Institute, are not considered here because of space limitations and their
somewhat less influential role vis-a-vis welfare policy compared to AEI
and Heritage. For details on Kristol's role in the development of conser-
vative think tanks, see Peter Steinfels, The Neoconservatives (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1979).
2. AEI was active in foreign policy as well. The Institute had ongoing projects
in "international affairs" and a "center for hemispheric studies." The
former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations, Jeane J. Kirkpatrick,
was an AEI fellow.
3. The composition of the Board of Trustees is noteworthy for its omissions.
There were no clergy, retired military officers, or labor leaders on it. In
1982 all members of the Board were white and male. During the same
period, of all AEI staff and resident scholars and fellows, only two were
women and one was black.
4. Recently appointed Supreme Court Associate Justice, Antonin Scalia, is
also an AEI alumnus.
5. In a book co-authored with his wife (and regular AEI contributor), Peter
Berger's reaction to liberalism took on phobic proportions. See Brigette
Berger and Peter Berger, The War Over the Family (Garden City, N.Y.:
Anchor, 1983).
6. In his formulation, Novak failed to explain how, on the one hand, the
corporation was one of the mediating structures, suffocated by big gov-
ernment, and, on the other, it was on a par with government as part of
the system of checks and balances, Such classification by convenience
raises questions about the purpose of the analysis.
7. The Center on Budget and Policy Priorities estimated that $60 billion was
cut from federal welfare programs which benefited low- and middle-
income Americans between 1982 and 1986.
8. See Robert Morris, Rethinking Social Welfare (New York: Longman, 1986).
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